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STOCK REDEMPTION PREMIUMS AS "ORDINARY
AND NECESSARY" BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS
I. Introduction
Corporations frequently find it desirable to issue stock which can be re-
deemed or called at a price in excess of its original issue price.' Such excess
amount, when paid upon redemption, is commonly called a "redemption pre-
mium." This practice of redeeming stock raises significant federal income tax
questions regarding the treatment of such payments for both the shareholder and
the redeeming corporation.' The fundamental question for the shareholder is
whether the payments will be treated as dividends or as proceeds from an ex-
change of assets.3 Generally, any redemption will be treated as a dividend unless
it qualifies under one of the exceptions set forth under §§ 302 (a), 302 (b), 303, or
331 of the Internal Revenue Code.4 These exception sections are critically im-
portant to shareholders because exchange treatment is generally more advanta-
geous to shareholders than dividend treatment since the former means that any
gain or loss will be capital gain or loss if the stock is a capital asset.5 As regards
the tax effect to the corporation-the concern of this note-the traditional federal
income tax treatment of the redemption payments has been to regard them as
capital expenditures.6 Accordingly, the payments so made' have been construed
as nondeductible by the courts pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 263 which
disallows deductions for capital expenditures. 7
Recently, however, an attempt was made to deduct the premium portion of
a redemption payment as an "ordinary and necessary" expense under Internal
Revenue Code § 162(a).8 In H. and G. Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,' the
case which provides the basis for this note, the taxpayer argued that a redemption
premium met the requirements of § 162(a) since the redemption was neces-
sitated by an "overriding corporate business interest."'" The Third Circuit denied
the deduction and held that as a prerequisite to the deduction, the "business
1 Redeemable shares of stock can be "called" or "purchased" by the issuing corporation
on the demand of the corporation or, occasionally, at the request of the shareholder. Thus,
since the shares may be called upon demand of the corporation, it generally becomes neces-
sary to set the call price higher than the market price at issuance. If this feature did not exist,
a corporation would undoubtedly have considerable difficulty selling the shares at issuance.
E. DONALDSON & J. PFAHL, CORPORATE FINANCE 141 (3rd ed. 1969); N. LATTIN, THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 135 at 512-17 (2d ed. 1971). See atso H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 160, at 296-97 (2nd ed. 1970).
2 See B. BITrxER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 111 9.01-9.65 (3rd ed. 1971).
3 Id.
4 See C. McCARTHY, THE FEDERAL INCOme TAX 680 (3rd ed. 1974).
5 B. BiTTER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9.20.
6 See, e.g., Arthur H. DuGrenier, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 931 (1972).
7 INT. REV. CODS OF 1954, § 263.
8 INT. RxV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a):
IN GENERAL-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business ....
9 495 F.2d 653 (3rd Cir. 1974).
10 This phrase did not appear in the court's opinion; rather, it arose in a brief article by
Professor Hutton of New York University School of Law on the redemption premium issue.
1 J. CORP. TAX. 346-47 (1974).
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interest" which prompts the redemption must be the preservation or survival of
the corporate existence." Even though the court did not find it necessary to
provide further reason for denial of the deduction, there are two other possible
rationales for denying the deduction which the court chose not to address: (1)
the payment had its "origin" in the acquisition or issuance of stock and was
therefore essentially a capital expense' and (2) § 311 absolutely bars the deduc-
tion since it states that no gain or loss to a corporation shall be recognized with
respect to its stock.'3
This note will discuss H. and G. Industries and analyze other questions
raised by the redemption premium problem. This discussion will enable practi-
tioners to forecast more accurately the probable success or failure of future at-
tempts to deduct payments attributable to a stock redemption premium.
II. H. and G. Industries
Since H. and G. Industries, Inc. u. Commissioner is an important recent
case dealing directly'4 with the redemption premium question, it is necessary to
consider it in some detail at the outset. The taxpayer had entered into a stock
purchase agreement with a Small Business Investment Corporation (SBIO) in
order to maintain adequate working capital and to liquidate an existing loan.'"
The agreement stipulated the following provisions: (1) the SBIC was to pur-
chase 2,000 shares of 8 percent cumulative convertible participating preferred
stock at $100 par value; 6 (2) after payment of the 8 percent dividend and taxes
the SBIC was to participate in income up to 12'/2 percent of annual net profits
(to a maximum of $14,000 annually) ;17 (3) the taxpayer had the option to call
all (but not part) of the stock at $120 a share;"8 (4) various other restrictions
involving permissible levels of current assets and net worth, mergers, compen-
sation of officers, and dividends on common stock; 9 (5) the agreement would
terminate only upon call of the preferred stock or upon conversions to common
stock.20
After complying with the agreement for four years, the taxpayer called the
preferred stock. It did so for two stated reasons: First, the large amount of
11 495 F.2d at 657.
12 See text accompanying notes 59-69 infra.
13 INT. RV. CODa op 1954, § 311.
14 In John Wanamaker Philadelphia v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 644 (3rd Cir. 1943) and
Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1942), the taxpayers
attempted to deduct redemption premiums on the ground that the securities constituted debt
and, therefore, were deductible pursuant to a treasury regulation which specifically allowed a
bond redemption premium deduction. However, in each case the courts denied the deduction
by holding the securities to be equity. Thus, the courts never addressed an argument similar
to the one made by the taxpayers in H. and G. Industries-that assuming the securities are
equity rather than debt, a redemption premium should be allowed -as an "ordinary and neces-
sary" deduction because the redemption is essential to relieve the taxpayer from the burden-
some contract.





20 Id. at 654-55.
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dividend payments was "strangling"21 its growth potential by reducing its work-
ing capital and; second, it could replace the redeemed stock and, thus, acquire
needed capital at a lower cost by obtaining a 7 percent conventional mortgage.'
The latter two reasons constituted the "overriding corporate business interest"
which motivated the redemption, and the corporation deducted the $40,000'3
difference between the issue price and the redemption price.24
After the Commissioner's case against the deduction was sustained by the
Tax Court,"5 H. and G. Industries made a two-part argument in the Third
Circuit. First, it contended that the redemption premium was deductible as an
"ordinary and necessary" business expense pursuant to Internal Revenue Code
§ 162(a)28 because the payment was made to terminate a burdensome contract
obligation with another party.' In support of its contention, the taxpayer relied
on cases in which the courts have allowed an "ordinary and necessary" deduction
for purchases of burdensome contracts,2 or more significantly, purchases of
stock of different corporations, 9 in order that the corporations might be relieved
of a contract previously made with that corporation. The taxpayer argued for
extension of these cases to allow a deduction when a company purchases its own
stock to relieve itself of a burdensome contract."
Second, the corporation based an argument for the deduction upon a de-
cision in the Fifth Circuit, Five Star Manufacturing Company v. Commissioner 1
The court allowed a deduction for payments by a corporation made to purchase
the stock of one of its shareholders. The taxpayer's claim which the court upheld
was that the purchase was "necessary" since the corporation could otherwise
neither borrow money nor acquire a patent license which was essential to the
corporation's business.2 2 Applying Five Star to the redemption situation in
H. and G. Industries, the taxpayer argued that because the court allowed a
deduction for the entire purchase price of its stock when a valid reason existed,
the taxpayer certainly should be permitted to deduct the redemption premium
alone since a good faith business reason had motivated the redemption.
In response to this two-part argument, the government placed considerable
reliance on § 311 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.3
21 Id. at 655.
22 Id.
23 This amount is derived as follows:
Number of shares issued (2000)
x redemption price ($120) = $240,000
Number of shares issued (2000)
x issue price ($100) = 200,000
Redemption premium $ 40,00024 See note 1 supra.
25 H. and G. Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 163 (1973).
26 INT. Rxv. CoDa oF 1954, § 162 (a).
27 495 F.2d at 655.
28 See, e.g., Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948).
29 See, e.g., Helvering v. Community Bond & Mortgage Corp., 74 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1935).
30 495 F.2d at 655.
31 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
32 Id. at 727.
33 The government also argued that John Wanamaker Philadelphia v. Commissioner, 139
F.2d 644 (3rd Cir. 1943) should be controlling in denying the deduction for a stock redemp-
tion premium; however, the court in H. and G. Industries summarily rejected its application
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Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (d), no gain or loss
shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution with respect to its
stock, of-
(1) its stock (or rights to acquire its stock), or
(2) property 4
This contention necessarily implies that the term "loss" as used in the statute is
synonymous with the word "deduction." Thus, any payment ancillary to a
stock redemption would seemingly be construed as a nondeductible expense. In
support of its position, the government cited Roberts & Porter, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.3 5 In Roberts, the Tax Court had allowed a deduction for the difference
between the call price ($106) and the issue price ($100) of a convertible bond
pursuant to a regulation36 that specifically allowed a deduction for bond pre-
miums. The court, however, denied the deduction for the remainder of the
purchase price which was paid in accordance with the issuance agreement.
Simce the later payments were attributable to the stock into which the bonds
were convertible, the court disallowed any further deduction under the authority
of § 311 . However, the government's reliance on Roberts in regard to H. and
G. Industries is curious for two reasons: (1) It is easily distinguishable from
H. and G. Industries since in the latter case there was a stock redemption as
opposed to a bond redemption in Roberts; and (2) in Roberts the court allowed
a deduction for the redemption premium and that was exactly what H. and G.
Industries was seeking.
Presented with these arguments, the court denied a § 162 deduction for
the redemption premium paid by H. and G. Industries solely" by distinguishing
Five Star Manufacturing on its facts. " The court held that the facts in H. and
to the present case. In John Wanamaker, the taxpayer attempted to deduct a redemption
premium on the ground that the redeemed security was debt rather than equity, and hence
deductible pursuant to a treasury regulation which specifically allowed a deduction for bond
redemption premiums. The court, however, held that the security was equity and denied the
deduction. 139 F.2d at 647-48. Although John Wanamaker denied a deduction for a stock
redemption premium, the court in H. and G. Industries did not find it controlling. Its
rationale was that the court in the former case did not address itself to the issue of whether
a stock redemption premium was deductible under § 162 (a) as a payment to be relieved of a
burdensome contract; rather, it merely addressed the taxpayer's contention that it was deducti-
ble as a bond redemption premium. Thus, the taxpayer's unique argument in the stock redemp-
tion context rendered John Wanamaker not applicable. 495 F.2d at 656.
34 INT. REv. CoD op 1954, § 311(a) (emphasis supplied).
35 37 T.C. 23 (1961).
36 The regulation section on which the court relied was Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c) (1) T.D.
6272, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 31. This section exists now in similar form as Treas. Reg. § 163-
3(c) (1) (1973).
37 37 T.C. at 27-31.
38 The court also cited in a footnote another reason which might prohibit a deduction in
the future. It was noted that the cases which the taxpayers cited for the proposition that the
deduction should be allowed on the basis of relieving itself of a burdensome contract are dis-
tinguishable. In the cases cited by the taxpayer the payments were merely substitutes for pay-
ments which would be deductible sometime in the future. In the present case, however, the
court said that the payments (redemption premium) were made to avoid future nondeductible
dividend payments. The court thus reasoned that in the cited cases the deductions were merely
accelerated to an earlier date. 495 F.2d at 657. However, it is important to note two points
about the court's statements: (1) the court did not rely on this reasoning to decide the case;
rather it was used as a mere surmise or conjecture as to future courts' treatment of the prob-
lem; and (2) these statements were directly solely at one facet of the taxpayer's argument-
relief from an onerous contract-the court did not relate this attack to other elements of the
taxpayer's argument, for example, that which relied on Five Star Manufacturing.
39 495 F.2d at 657.
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G. Industries did not approach the life or death situation that was present in
Five Star Manufacturing. Accordingly, the court reasoned that H. and G. In-
dustries would not be forced to go out of existence if it failed to redeem its
stock, while in Five Star the purchase of its stock was essential to corporate
existence.4" The court argued that the redemption as made was no more than
an astute business decision to take advantage of lower interest rates on debt
financing.4' In making this limited decision, the court left unanswered, however,
the question whether § 311 was a complete bar to the deduction under any cir-
cumstances, including corporate life or death situations. The court, however,
did acknowledge the legitimacy of § 311 as applicable to the issue at hand when
it stated that to allow a deduction in all situations would completely undermine
the specific prohibitions of § 311.2
III. Conceptual Obstacles to Allowance of the Deduction
A. The Life or Death Requirement
As indicated in the consideration of H. and G. Industries, one of the pri-
mary impediments to the deduction of a stock redemption premium is the require-
ment that it be necessary to preserve the life of the corporation. This principle
was refined in Jim Walter Corporation v. United States,3 which was decided
three months after H. and G. Industries. There, the taxpayer corporation had
purchased some of its own outstanding warrants, ostensibly because it was re-
quired to do so by its underwriters in connection with a new public offering."
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit denied the deduction for the total cost of the
warrants by expressly limiting the Five Star Manufacturing holding to situations
where the purchase is actually necessary to preserve the corporate existence.4"
Additionally, in Jim Walter the court failed to be persuaded by United
States v. Smith," which the taxpayer had cited. In Smith, the taxpayer corpo-
ration had assumed certain liabilities of a partnership upon the purchase of its
operating assets. The corporation took an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense deduction pursuant to § 162 (a) when it satisfied one of these liabilities.
The Fifth Circuit, the same court which decided Jim Walter, held that if a cor-
poration's primary purpose in assuming the liability was other than to acquire
assets, then the deduction may be allowed' Yet, the court in Jim Walter was
unwilling to establish such a broad principle, based on Five Star Manufacturing
40 Id.
41 The taxpayer, by redeeming the stock and replacing it with debt financing (7% mort-
gage notes), decreased its yearly cash outlay. The reason for this is that instead of 8-12Y2%
dividend payments each year, it was now only required to pay 7% interest on the note. Addi-
tionally, the interest paid on the note was tax deductible while the dividend payments were
not.
42 495 F.2d at 658.
43 498 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1974).
44 The underwriters had believed that the warrants might be exercised and, since the
agreement with the warrant holders required the corporation to issue high interest bonds in
addition to stock there was a concern that the issuance would be impaired. Id. at 634.
45 Id. at 639.
46 418 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1969).
47 Id. at 596-97.
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and Smith, to the effect that a deduction should be allowed for an expense of
recapitalization or other reformation of capital structure whenever it serves a
business purpose other than the acquisition of property."8 Instead, it held to the
rule that the deduction will be denied unless the purchase is necessary to the
taxpayer's survival.49 This position is puzzling for two reasons. First, there was
no mention in either Five Star Manufacturing or Smith that in order to main-
tain the deduction it was necessary to demonstrate that the corporation would
go out of existence but for the action so taken. However, it is not difficult to
understand why the court came to such a conclusion; the facts in Jim Walter
and H. and G. Industries did not match the emergency situation that existed in
Five Star. Second, to require a corporation to have a life or death circumstance
in order to avail itself of a business deduction completely undercuts past judicial
interpretations of § 162(a). Specifically, the two requirements"0 of § 162(a)
which the life or death requirement undermines are the "ordinary" and "neces-
sary" requirements-typically the two most difficult to satisfy.
To illustrate the inconsistency between the life or death requirement and
the judicial interpretations of ordinary and necessary, it is necessary to consider
the judicial definitions accorded these two words. First, in order for an expense
to be considered "ordinary" it must be normal, usual, or customary in the type
of business involved." Also, it has been held that the expense need not be habit-
ual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer must make them on any regular
basis. 2 Additionally, the deduction is not barred if it is unique or nonrecurring,53
nor is it barred if the payment is voluntary.5" Certainly, a corporate stock redemp-
tion in order to save future expenses and to prevent future decreases in working
capital should be considered as an expense which is normal, usual, or customary.
Undoubtedly, other corporations, under conditions similar to those facing H.
and G. Industries, would pay a premium on a stock redemption in order to
replace the equity capital with debt that provides substantially lower fixed 5
yearly payments. Then, too, the courts have held that "necessary," as used in
§ 162(a), means "helpful and appropriate" in maintaining a business.5 Fur-
thermore, contrary to the interpretation of Jim Walter and the H. and G. In-
dustries courts, the expense need not be indispensable or absolutely essential ' to
qualify under § 162(a). Thus, to be granted a § 162(a) business deduction,
48 498 F.2d at 638-39.
49 Id.
50 In addition to "ordinary" and "necessary," the courts have fashioned two additional
requirements to a § 162(a) deduction: "proximately related to the taxpayer's business,"
4A J. MERrENS, THE LAw oP FEDERAL INCOME TAxATIoN § 25.09, at 54-55 (J. Malone ed.
1972); "reasonable in amount," Commissioner v. Lincoln Electric Co., 176 F.2d 815 (6th
Cir. 1949).
51 International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1960).
52 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
53 Id.
54 Pepper v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 886, 895 (1961).
55 In H. and G. Industries, even though there was no requirement that the corporation
pay dividends on the redeemed preferred stock, the dividends were practically "fixed" since
they were cumulative dividends and, if the corporation failed to pay them, it would reduce
significantly its ability to sell stock in the future.
56 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
57 Slaymaker Lock Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1001, 1008 (1952).
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it is not required that the taxpayer make the expense in order to survive; rather,
it is enough that the transaction is beneficial to the business.58
B. The Origin Test
Another obstacle which a taxpayer must contend with, in attempting to
deduct redemption premiums, is the "origin" test created by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Gilmore.59 The test states that in looking at questions involv-
ing deductibility of an expense, the focus should be on the origin of the expense
and not on "the potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer.' 60
In Gilmore, the Court was faced with the question of whether a husband could
deduct legal fees incurred in a divorce proceeding. Although divorces are gener-
ally personal in nature and thus nondeductible activities, the taxpayer contended
that the fees should be deductible since the proceeding involved the applicability
of the community property laws to certain business assets.61 The Court, over
the dissents of Justices Black and Douglas, 2 resolved a conflict among the cir-
cuit courts by disallowing the deduction because the expense did not have a
business origin. Accordingly, the fees were considered nondeductible personal
expenses since they had not originated from business activity. The fact that the
fees were incurred to protect income-producing assets was rendered nugatory by
the Court because this was regarded as merely a "consequence" of the original
purpose for incurring the expense.05
Although the origin test was not used to deny the redemption premium
deduction in H. and G. Industries, there is an indication that it may be used in
the future since the court in Jim Walter placed considerable emphasis on it.
The taxpayer there attempted to use the test to obtain a deduction for the cost
of the warrants by contending that the warrants had "originated" with the issue
of stock rather than the issue of bonds.64 Thus, the taxpayer contended the
issuance was initiated for the deductible business purpose of saving interest. 5
The court failed to be persuaded by this argument and applied the Gilmore
rationale, though in a different manner. It held that the payment to repurchase
the warrants was required by the underwriters in connection with a public offer-
ing and was thus a recapitalization expense. 0 The purchase of the warrants,
having been characterized as a recapitalization expense by the court, was then
held nondeductible pursuant to existing precedents. There is a flaw, however,
in the court's application of Gilmore to the issue presented in Jim Walter. The
Supreme Court in the former case was concerned with the deductibility of the
expense from the perspective of whether its origin was business or personal in
58 Commissioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'g 17 T.C. 705 (1951).
59 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
60 Id. at 49.
61 Id. at 40.
62 Id. at 52.
63 Id. at 51-52.
64 498 F.2d at 635.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 638.
67 United States v. Hilton Hotels, 397 U.S. 580 (1970); Woodward v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 572 (1970); Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
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nature, rather than with whether such expenditures were capital in nature or
ordinary business expenses:
[W]e resolve the conflict among the lower courts on the question before us
in favor of the view that the origin and character of the claim with respect
to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences
upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether
the expense was "business" or "personal" and hence whether it is deductible
or not ....
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's application of the Gilmore test to questions involving
capital origins is a clear extension of the test to areas not contemplated in the
Supreme Court decision.
As previously indicated, this test has not been used to deny the deduction
for redemption premiums; however, its expansion to other situations69 makes it
reasonable to assume that in the future taxpayers attempting to use the deduc-
tion will be confronted with the test. Conceivably, it may be the government's
most potent weapon in combating the deduction since the Jim Walter rationale
can now be used to deny the deduction. Undoubtedly, if the issue arose again,
the Internal Revenue Service would argue that even though there was an over-
riding corporate business interest in redeeming the stock, it would not be deduct-
ible because the expense originated in the issuance or acquisition of equity capital
and was thus a nondeductible capital expense.
C. Section 311
As noted previously, a major element of the government's argument in
H. and G. Industries was that § 311 constituted a complete bar to an ordinary
and necessary deduction for a redemption premium. Section 311 prohibits, with
certain exceptions, the recognition of gains and losses on distributions with re-
spect to stock. At first glance it appears that the government's position in H. and
G. Industries is unassailable. However, the validity of its argument is suspect
for two reasons. First, there is a flaw in the contention that § 311 constitutes an
absolute bar to an ordinary and necessary deduction because the statute Only
forbids the recognition of losses not deductions. This phraseology employed by
Congress is significant since the Code makes a clear distinction between the
concepts of a loss and deduction. Second, the legislative history of § 311 raises
doubt as to whether the enactment was intended to deny an ordinary and neces-
sary deduction; rather, it seems that it was intended to bar corporations from
recognizing gains and losses, whether capital or otherwise, on the exchange of
its assets.
As regards the first reason stated above, the presence of the term "loss" in
68 372 U.S. at 49 (emphasis supplied).
69 See United States v. Hilton Hotels, 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (appraisals for mergers);
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 '(1970) (appraisal, attorney's, and accountant's
fees for mergers); Jim Walter Corporation v. United States, 498 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1974)
(warrant purchases); Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974) (legal
fees for antitrust claim).
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§ 311 is an indication that Congress did not intend to deny an ordinary and
necessary deduction. In support of this conclusion consider the part of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code's Income Tax Subtitle entitled "Itemized Deductions for
Individuals and Corporations."7 ° This part consists of sections which allow,
disallow, or limit certain types or categories of deductions. Included therein
are § 162'1 and § 165.2 These provisions deal respectively with "Trade or
Business Expenses" (ordinary and necessary expenses) and "Losses." Addition-
ally, the part treats other expenses such as: interest,78 taxes,' depreciation,7 5
and charitable contributions. 6 Clearly, then, losses as used in § 165 and ordi-
nary and necessary expenses as used in § 162 are mere categories or types of
deductions which may either be prohibited or allowed. Thus, based on the
treatment of deductions under this construction of the statute, it is evident that
the government's interpretation of § 311 in H. and G. Industries was inaccurate
because § 311 prohibits only a specific type of deduction, a loss deduction pursuant
to § 165. Furthermore, the enactments should not be construed as barring the
recognition of all deductions because if Congress had intended this in § 311,
undoubtedly it would have used the more generic term deduction rather than
using a mere category of a deduction-loss.
Moreover, there are indications in the Code that Congress, in using the phrase
"gain or loss," intended to prohibit the recognition of gains and losses on the sale
or exchange of assets rather than to prohibit ordinary and necessary deductions.
To illustrate this finding it is necessary to consider the only Code sections dealing
exclusively with the phrase "gain or loss"; i.e., Subchapters 077 and P7' of the
Income Tax Subtitle of the Code. These subchapters treat "Gain or Loss on
Disposition of Property" and "Capital Gains and Losses," respectively. Included
in these provisions are sections which specify the determination of the amount and
recognition of gain or loss,79 the treatment of wash sales of stock and securities, 0
capital gain and loss treatment,81 and general and special rules for determining
capital gains and losses.8 2 Although these sections encompass different income tax
concepts, there is an element common to all: Each pertains to the recognition .of
gains or losses on the sale or exchange of assets, while none pertain to the ordinary
and necessary expense deduction of § 162. Hence, since it appears that the term
"gain or loss" is used in the Code to deal with the resultant tax effect of a sale or
exchange of assets, the term undoubtedly has a more specific meaning than that
which the government attached to it in H. and G. Industries. This view was
raised by the attorney for H. and G. Industries during the oral argument of the
70 INT. RPEv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 161-88.
71 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
72 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165.
73 INT. RV. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
74 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164.
75 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
76 INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
77 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001-1111.
78 INT. Rmv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-53.
79 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001-02.
80 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1091.
81 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-12.
82 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221-53.
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case before the Third Circuit;s, it was his belief that the court was persuaded by
his argument." Although the court did not directly address this issue in its
opinion, his belief was apparently accurate because the court did recognize that
if a life or death situation existed, § 311 might not constitute a complete bar to
an ordinary and necessary deduction for a redemption premium. s
Further indicia appear in § 311's legislative history that the intention of
Congress was to prohibit the recognition of gains and losses on sales or exchanges
of assets rather than to deny the application of § 162 on corporate stock redemp-
tions. The statute, according to the Senate Committee Report on § 311,11 was
passed to incorporate the Supreme Court's holding in General Utilities & Oper-
ating Co. v. Helvering.' This case involved a corporate distribution of appre-
ciated property which was made in order to avoid tax on the capital gain that
would have resulted if the corporation had sold the property. Although the
government argued that the sale should have been attributed to the corporation
rather than the distributee-shareholders, the Court allowed the transaction to
remain untouched.8 After the decision, General Utilities had always been cited
for the rule that no gain or loss should be recognized on the distribution of a
corporation with respect to its stock.88 In 1954, Congress codified the General
Utilities holding by enacting § 311. Thus, clearly, codifying General Utilities
and in employing the term "gain or loss" rather than "deduction," Congress
intended that § 311 was to apply to deny a gain or loss on the sale or exchange
of property"L-a far different focus than the prevention of an ordinary and neces-
sary expense deduction.
IV. Conclusion
Future attempts to deduct a redemption premium pursuant to § 162(a)
83 Conversation with Mr. Martin D. Cohen, attorney for H. and G. Industries and mem-
ber of the New Jersey Bar, Dec. 27, 1974 (transcript on file at Notre Dame Lawyer office).
84 Id.
85 "[W]e therefore do not reach the question of whether a § 162 deduction limited to more
oppressive corporate circumstances than those presented by the instant case would be con-
sistent with § 311." 495 F.2d at 658. (Emphasis added.)
86 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1954).
87 296 U.S. 200 (1935). Although the Senate Committee Report did not specify this
case by name, most commentators believed that this is the one that the committee was referring
to. See note 89 infra.
88 296 U.S. at 206-07. The Court did not decide this point directly but merely reversed
the lower court's holding which had attributed the sale to the corporation. The Court did not
decide the issue involving attributing the transaction to the corporation rather than the share-
holders because of a procedural mistake by the government. Id.
89 See, e.g., J. CHoMmIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 576 (2d ed. 1973);
Mintz & Plumb, Dividends in Kind-The Thunderbolts and the New Look, 10 TAX L Aw Rv.
41, 44-45 (1954).
90 When Congress enacted § 311(d), in 1969, it presented another indication that § 311
was intended to address uses or abuses of sales or exchanges of assets as compared with uses
or abuses of deductions. This subsection states that when appreciated property is distributed
to redeem stock, gain must be recognized on the difference between the fair market value of
the stock and the adjusted basis of the property distributed. The Senate Committee Report
of this amendment to § 311 indicates that Congress was concerned with the practice of certain
insurance companies of distributing appreciated stock to shareholders in exchange for their
own stock. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 279 (1969). Note that this scheme was
similar to that in General Utilities and its effect was basically the same-gams were attributable
to the shareholders, with the result that capital gains tax was avoided at the corporate level.
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will encounter intense opposition from the Internal Revenue Service and the
courts. Specifically, since the IRS will possess the conceptual weapons discussed
above,' a taxpayer corporation will have considerable difficulty in sustaining its
burden of proof on the allowance of the deduction. Yet, this burden may not
be insurmountable. Indeed, of the three obstacles to the deduction which were
analyzed, the origin test is the only one which a perceptive court should employ
to deny the deduction; the remaining two obstacles, however, are imperfect ra-
tionales for disallowing the deduction.
Even though the life or death requirement is poorly reasoned, the courts
will probably continue to use it to deny the deduction. As previously indicated,
requiring corporations to have a life or death situation facing them as a pre-
requisite to deduction of a redemption premium when another valid business
reason already exists is contrary to the ordinary and necessary requirements of
§ 162 (a) .12 A better approach would allow a corporation to deduct the premium
if it redeems to conserve working capital, or if it redeems to relieve itself from a
burdensome contract obligation. This approach should not be attacked on the
ground that it fails to meet the requirements of § 162 (a) since it is an expense
which satisfies the judicial interpretation of "ordinary and necessary.""3 The courts,
however, as evidenced by the recent decision in Jim Walter Corporation, are
apparently placing increasing stress on the life or death requirement thus making
it a continued hindrance to corporations which attempt to deduct redemption
premiums.
Although the government's position on § 311 contains flaws, it does retain
some validity to the redemption premium question. As examined above, there
is considerable doubt whether it was the intention of Congress, in enacting § 311,
to deny a § 162 (a) deduction; yet, there is commentary" that the section should
properly apply to deny a loss deduction when depreciated property is used to
redeem the stock. To illustrate the correct application of § 311 to the problem,
assume a corporation needed to redeem a share of stock which was issued at
$100 and which is callable at $120. Assume further that the redemption pay-
ments to the shareholder consist of property which is currently worth $120
(the redemption price) but which has an adjusted basis of $130." 5 If § 311
did not apply, the corporation might have a $10 loss deduction. 8 Section 311,
however, should properly be applied to deny the $10 deduction; but it should
not apply to deny the $20 ordinary and necessary deduction for the amount
91 See text accompanying notes 43-90 supra.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Hutton, Business Expense Deduction for Premium Paid upon Redemption, 1 J. CORP.
TAx. 34647 (1974).
95 Note that if the asset which was distributed had an adjusted basis of less than $120,§ 311(d) would require that the corporation recognize a gain on the difference between the
asset's fair market value and its adjusted basis.
96 The $10 loss is derived as follows:
Redemption price $120




attributable to the premium." This treatment comports with the proper purpose
of the statute since § 311 is used to deny a loss deduction on the exchange of
an asset, rather than to deny a § 162(a) ordinary and necessary expense deduc-
tion.
Notwithstanding the flaws in the arguments against the deduction for stock
redemption premium payments, it is believed that most attempts to deduct it
pursuant to § 162(a) will fail. The transaction will be attacked on the ground
that it had its origin in a capital undertaking98 and is therefore nondeductible
in accordance with § 263."9 A successful attempt at deductibility, however, may
be realized if the corporation needs to purchase or redeem due to a life or death
situation or similar circumstances. Jim Walter Corporation v. United States,
one of the most important recent decisions which have employed the origin test
to disallow deductions due to capital origins, has apparently carved out an excep-
tion to this general rule. This opinion can only be interpreted as holding that a
life or death situation somehow negates the effects of the origin test. Thus to
suggest to a corporate client that it deduct a redemption premium in other than
life or death situations would be precarious in light of the existing judicial
trends.
Joseph L. Baldino
97 The $20 redemption premium is the difference between the call price ($120) and the
issue price ($100).
98 A capital undertaking in that the payment arose as a result of the issuance or acquisition
of stock.
99 INT. Rnv. CODa op 1954, § 263.
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